When real religion becomes a secular religion

The total confusion of “secular” and “religious” religions becomes most obvious when someone criticizes the very idea of secularism (in French, “laïcité“) for its religious bias. As an article on Political Theology suggests, even the Notre Dame of Paris can be called a “secular cathedral“, inasmuch as it symbolizes a sort of “cultural Christianity” that nevertheless remains a religious idea, despite being non-religious. In other words, the cathedral, which – as the less educated observer would think – is an unquestionably religious symbol is not really a religious symbol, but a symbol of something else (a certain cultural and political ideology), while this ideology is indeed religious in the sense of being pro-Catholic. It is indeed impossible to decide what the real problem of the author is: is it that religion thus becomes secular, or that secularism becomes religious? We have all heard the same stories about “politicization” as a pathology of religion, and “religionization” as a pathology of politics. But when both are invoked in the same breath, the two suspicions seem to cancel each other out. If a religion becomes secular by becoming political, but the secular in turn becomes religious by the very same act, the only logical conclusion is that the main objection against this religion is that it remains just as religious as it was before. Which is not only paradoxical to the point of being non-sensical, but also historically absurd. Words like “catho-laïcité” may sound well for an ear trained on postmodern oxymorons, but no Catholic will ever forget how laicism emerged as a primarily anti-Catholic ideology. The confiscation of Church property during the French Revolution, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790, the de-Christianization campaign, the 1905 law on the separation of the churches and the state, and all similar events are very hard to see as a clandestine cooperation between the French Republic and the Catholic Church; or if it was, it was the most well-hidden conspiracy in the history of church-state relations.

The fact that laicism has since become more tempered and does not nowadays exclude cultural references to the Catholic tradition only proves that religion, culture, and politics are not distinct fields that can be hermetically separated. But this is no new revelation, and those who still think that it is something outrageous should first explain why “cultural Christianity” – which may well be a secular idea – is to be rejected not because it is secular but because it is a religious one.

Feu dans la charpente de Notre Dame photographié depuis le square René Vivani à 19 h 51. (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Incendie_Notre_Dame_de_Paris.jpg)

“Secular Religions” after a year

Or why it is so hopeless to change people’s minds on “religion”

This day marks the first anniversary of the publication of this book:

It is currently available in about 130 libraries, mainly in Europe and the US, and at least the Introduction can be read for free on academia.edu.

There is no reason to celebrate, though, for the main experience of this past year was that practically no one could be convinced of the core message of the book. No matter how many examples were presented that undermined the whole distinction of the secular and the religious, or how all definitional attemps of religion were pulled into doubt, the overall reaction was always the well-known commonplace “Oh, this can’t be true, there MUST be a difference!”

It’s not that I’m surprised, of course. “Religion” has always been what an educated German would call a Kampfbegriff, a word that does not describe a thing but defend a position in a debate. Now since the debate between those who call themselves “religious” and “secular” is far from over, it would be futile to expect that any of them will change their mind because of contrary examples and theoretical arguments. After all, the belief in the existence of “religion” is itself a belief. And not even the least dogmatic one.

(Hm, maybe I should start making TikTok videos instead.)

The continuing popularity of “secular religions”

I almost forgot to mention that the topic of “secular religions” became so popular recently that even people like Elon Musk created x.com messages about it.

“Childless hedonism” thus seems to be a new member of the secular-religious family. If I were to write my book now, I should add this one. And many others, since I discover further examples almost every day. And this is what some people call a “secular age”.

The “sacred property” of language

Back from a conference in Warsaw. „Residues and Innovations within Imperial Orders: Political Assemblies in Continental Europe, 1800–1850”. The question is – I hear you cry – what I have got to do with a topic like that. Well, my presentation was about the struggle for linguistic emancipation in the Hungarian parliament and its connection to the sacralization of language that had been going on an at least since the late 18th century. Calling language a “sacred property” and the cultivation of language a “sacred duty”, venerating the leaders of the language reform movement as “prophets” or “saviors”, or speaking of Hungarian as the most ancient language created by God are only some elements of this sacralization that I’m not the first to observe (see e. g. István Margócsy’s “My Goddess, My Fate, My Everything, Hungarian Language!”). It may even be said that the language issue was part of the concurrently emerging “nation-religion” which authors like András Gerő described not as a contingent by-product but the very essence of nationalism. My only regret is that I’ve missed to add “LANGUAGE” as a separate entry to my recently published book on Secular Religions. But this is just one omission, for you learn about new possible additions almost every day.

Ferenc Plathy: The Apotheosis of Kazinczy (the leader of the language reform), 1859.

Btw, this is not to say that all this is mere nonsense that should be overcome by a more rationalistic approach to language. Without such devotion (or, if you like, “fanaticism”) no transformative politics is possible. It is in fact a paradoxically realist conclusion that when politics is understood not as “business as usual”, the administration of daily affairs, but as politics PER SE, in its true essence, it becomes inevitably inseparable from so-called “religious” aspects.

My own contribution will be published later, but here is the short abstract of my paper for the conference:

“A non-negligible factor of every parliament’s operation is the language in which debates are conducted and accepted laws are formulated. The language of the Hungarian parliament (more exactly the Diet of the Estates) was traditionally Latin, and although the idea of making Hungarian an official language was raised already at the end of the 18th century, its realization was the work of so-called “reform diets” between 1825 and 1844. The paper examines how language became one of the most important issues in parliamentary debates of the time, how it was related to other topics, and most of all, how it became the basis of a peculiar parliamentary (and extra-parliamentary) rhetoric in which language appeared as a “sacrament”, the main politico-religious symbol of emerging nationalism, all this in opposition to the centralizing and Germanizing tendencies of the Habsburg Empire. Although the explicit aim of this was to return to the allegedly ancient heritage of Hungary (in terms of language and cult), it was in fact an element of the modern phenomenon of “nation-religions” that were also present in other European countries, replacing or overriding former denominational commitments.”

The savioress

On the way home from the EASR 2024 Conference, I just ran into the latest issue of the German magazine Stern that showed Kamala Harris as an “Erlöserin” (literally, a “savioress” or female redemptor). The most interesting thing here is not that journalists use such bombastic religious language – for religion still has this rhetoric force in our allegedly secular societies – but that the illustration itself shows a double secularization of the religious:

Since the savioress, the new presidential candidate of the Democratic Party is here depicted in the guise of the Statue of Liberty (which was already a secular-religious symbol replacing the statues of old gods with that of a new goddess), one is inclined to say that the use of religious imagery is more than just a journalistic cliché. It rather expresses the constant migration of the holy from its traditional sources to our allegedly secular culture.

Ecology in the discourse of secular religions

Today, I made my presentation at EASR 2024. Following the main topic of the conference, I demonstrated the “Ecology” chapter of my book. I was a little worried whether it would not offend some devout ecologists, but it was in fact very well received. We had a good conversation with a fairly large audience, and even my conclusion about the impossibility of defining religion (illustrated here by the case study of ecology as a secular religion) turned out to be less alarming than I’d expected. There were in fact many other scholars who seemed to be as skeptical about the religious-secular divide as I was. Most of them, however, preferred the terminology of “implicit religion”, which was a little surprise for me. Not because I hadn’t known the term before (or Edward Bailey, who coined it) but I didn’t realize how important it was for so many. If I’d known, I would have covered it more thoroughly in my own book, although I’m still not convinced that implicit religion is a less problematic concept than secular religion (or, for that matter, than “quasi”, “surrogate”, “intrinsic”, “remixed”, etc. religions). In any case, here is the short abstract of my presentation:

“While many religious traditions have (or can be re-interpreted as having) an ecological vision, there are also modern, secular forms of ecological thought and related movements which are sometimes described as ‘secular religions’, showing a substantive or functional analogy with their overtly religious counterparts. Such descriptions can be harshly critical, debunking the alleged “dogmatism” and “intolerance” of deep ecology, or ridiculing the ‘saints’ and ‘rituals’ of climate activism. On the other hand, there are some attempts which overtly declare that ecological thought should become something ‘like’ (even if not exactly as) a religion: an overarching code that requires a true conversion, with nature as a sacred entity at its center. Without such a basic transformation of human attitudes, the principles of ecology would remain shallow and without effect, especially when compared to the magnitude of the challenge.

The paper analyzes the discourse of these different approaches, using a concise set of examples from both scholarly literature and popular journalism from the 2010s to the present day. The scope of the investigation extends to mentions of ‘ecology’, ‘ecologism’, ‘environmentalism’, ‘climate activism’, ‘warmism’, and related topics such as ‘animal rights’, ‘vegetarianism’, and (ethical) ‘veganism’ in contemporary discourse, in connection with expressions like ‘secular religion’ and its synonyms (‘surrogate religion’, ‘secular faith’ or ‘cult’, etc.).

The prospective thesis is that both the negative and positive approaches – despite their different normative outlook – are right in suggesting that a radical ecological theory and practice is impossible without sharing some features of traditional religions: an idea of the sacred, a comprehensive worldview, a moral code, and at least some ritual and symbolic manifestations of commitment that bind the community together. What is more difficult to tell is whether the adjective ‘secular’ is needed at all in the discourse of such a ‘religion’. Or rather, whether the entire distinction between secular and genuine religions is not superfluous in the case of any sufficiently serious form of ecology.”

EASR 2024

The conference of the European Association for the Study of Religion. This year the topic is “Nature, Ecology, and Religious Responses to Climate Change”, so I will present the “Ecology” part of my secular religions topic. But there will be other interesting presentations, for instance on implicit religions, which seem to be a surprisingly popular term here. For more information, see the conference homepage.

We have dethroned the old Gods

A new piece by Alexander Grau from the Neue Züricher Zeitung. The title goes: “Only those who respect limit values will be redeemed: we have dethroned the old gods [but] all the more eagerly believe in new ones.” Not very interesting, it actually repeats the usual mantra of dogmatism, intolerance, preachers, heretics, exorcism, etc., the whole Hollywoodian parody of medieval religiosity. This time in connection with climate activism, migration politicies, minorities and gender, but this is nothing new, either. (See some of my earlier posts here or here or even here.)

I’m really starting to be afraid that such journalistic clichés may destroy the whole credibility of secular / religious comparisons in the academia as well. Hm, I must finish my book as soon as possible.

Saviors, Apocalypse, Salvation, Witch-Hunt, and the Road to Hell

No, these words are not from a book on medieval church history. They are from a recent article on artificial intelligence in New Atlantis, written by Adam Elkus. The article, moreover, also mentions spirits, demons, demonic forces, heresies, rituals – and again, this is not just a play with words. In a refreshingly erudite manner, it draws an analogy between our recent trust in algorithms to save us from ourselves and our more ancient belief in non-human agents to do the same. The author even uses Charles Taylor’s concepts of “porous” and “buffered” selves from his famous book A Secular Age in a way that is an overt criticism of the whole idea of so-called “secularization”.

To be sure, Elkus is no religious scholar, and this is still not an article on secularization or secular religions. It makes some very profound comments on human desires and the intentions to control them, while also points to some serious misunderstandings about human nature, ethics, and rationality. What seems nevertheless obvious is that a “religious” language (in this case, more precisely, the language of medieval Christianity) remains unavoidable when discussing any such question. This is no mistake, and not – or not only – a form of clickbait journalism.

Which all of us are forced to practice sometimes, anyway (see e.g. the title of this post). Or the picture below.

Tenture de l’Apocalypse au château d’Angers. Photo taken by Remi Jouan. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Last thoughts on 2020

Just a few things I did in 2020:

In February, I wrote a review on Carlo Invernizzi-Accetti’s What is Christian Democracy? for our blog at UPS. The title “Christian democracy without Christianity?” sounds a little bombastic, I know, but that’s how blogs work. And it wasn’t my idea, but the editor’s.

What christian democracy politics religion and ideology | European  government, politics and policy | Cambridge University Press

From February to May I had a course at the Széchenyi István College for Advanced Studies, based on my Political Theologies (2018), something I’d like to continue as an English-language book on Secular Religions in 2021.

Könyv: Politikai teológiák (Nyirkos Tamás)

Still in February, I completed a manuscript for the journal Christianity-World-Politics on “Secular religions and the religious/secular divide” (forthcoming in 2021).

In March (just a few days before COVID-related restrictions) I presented a paper on French Catholic politicians at a workshop called “Oratory and representation: parliamentary discourses and practices in the 19th century” in Helsinki. A written version is to be published by the European Review of History in 2021.

Der Reichskanarienvogel

In April, I wrote another review for UPS about Rémi Brague’s Curing Mad Truths: Medieval Wisdom for the Modern Age. To my surprise, the author personally congratulated me. (It seems that automatic translations are becoming better. Or worse?)

Curing Mad Truths: Medieval Wisdom for the Modern Age (Catholic Ideas for a  Secular World): Brague, Rémi: 9780268105693: Amazon.com: Books

In May, I reviewed Gábor Borbély’s book on the philosophy of religion for the journal BUKSZ. At least I had an opportunity to express all my doubts about the concept of religion, a topic that I begin to be obsessed by now.

In June, I wrote a paper for Acta Humana on “The Religion of Human Rights”, published in Hungarian this fall, and also forthcoming in English in 2021.

In August, I published an article titled “Secular religion in America” in the popular historical journal Rubicon. Popularity can be dangerous, too, but I somehow avoided harsh criticism. (Despite the sensible topic.)

Still in August – thanks to the temporary relief between the first and second wave of the pandemic – we had a “professional picnic” with students of Corvinus University. My lectures dealt with the topic of surveillance; again, not without reference to the theological analogies of panopticism.

And a little surprise, also in August: Routledge published my 2018 book The Tyranny of the Majority in a paperback edition. Is it a sign of success? I found 112 copies in libraries around the world. Which doesn’t seem like a lot, but just to think that your book is available at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Rutgers, Brandeis, Duke, Fordham, or the Library of Congress is enough to give you chills. Maybe that’s why Routledge approached me whether I had a new book to propose. I certainly do, but this is a task for 2021 (see above).

The Tyranny of the Majority: History, Concepts, and Challenges - 1st E

In September, I started a new course with Széchenyi College. This time on “The End of History” thesis and its critics. From Joachim of Fiore to Francis Fukuyama and beyond.

Then again, in October, I had to return to the French conservatives, presenting a paper at a conference on religion in the 18th century (also to be published in 2021).

I kept on writing reviews, too. This time on Tara Isabella Burton’s Strange Rites: New Religions for a Godless World, a book I’ve mentioned several times here.

And November was even more eventful. One of my friends asked me to contribute to a special issue of the Journal of Political and Military Sociology. The topic is “patriotism”, which gives me an opportunity to examine whether secular religions’ literature distingusihes between patriotism and nationalism. The date of publication is scheduled to be 2022.

And, as you all know by now, we had a great workshop on “Christianity, Politics, and Secular Religions” on November 20, 2020. I still don’t know how I managed to convince such famous authors to participate. Sometimes you’re just lucky. Or maybe the topic of political or secular religions still has its appeal. What’s more, most of them agreed to provide a written paper for our new English language journal Pro Publico Bono in 2021.

In Hungary, we also have a habit of popularizing science for a wider audience. Events like the “Celebration of Hungarian Science” or “Researchers’ Night” are fairly popular among the general public. In November, I gave two such online lectures. One on “Pandemics then and now: historical lessons and contemporary political issues”. Again, not without its politico-theological connections, from Carl Schmitt to Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben. And another one on “Politics as a surrogate religion”.

The last thing I remember from 2020 is a December conference of doctoral students at the Corvinus University, a panel called “Religion and politics.” The best presentation was about Reinhold Niebuhr‘s criticism of secular religions. So the topic doesn’t seem to fade away, at least not in 2021.

A Happy New Year!